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iAbstract
This paper explores the effects of colleges for higher vocational education on the labour
market success of their graduates. Using data about the labour market position of Dutch
graduates from higher vocational education, and applying multi-level statistical modelling
techniques it is shown that for four domains (finding a job, level of job, monthly wages, and
wages per hour) the colleges did hardly differ substantially. Most of the institutional
variation occured at the department level within the colleges, but these department effects
appeared to be small as well and not always very stable over the years. The discussion
focuses on the implication for using labour market data for the construction of institutional
performance indicators. It is shown that the ranking of colleges on their labour market
performance  changes as soon as input variables are controlled for. It is therefore important
to look at the ‘net’ outcomes or ‘added value’ rather than the ‘gross’ outcomes.
11 Output-based quality control
In most western countries a growing interest in educational indicators can be demonstrated.
These indicators are used as summary statistics for measuring the quality of the
educational system. The use of key indicators enables policy makers and educational
authorities to assess the performance of their educational system, by enabling a systematic
comparison of the quality of education between countries, between years, between
regions, between institutes or between types of education.
This increase of interest in the public reporting on the functioning of education is due to the
following factors:
! a growing awareness that improvement of the quality of education is necessary to
increase Europe's competitiveness on a global market and to face the challenges of the
future (c.f. European Commission, 1993; IRDAC, 1990);
! constraints on educational budgets due to higher enrollments, forcing the institutes of
education to perform more effectively and efficiently;
! increasing demands from consumers (parents and students) to be informed about the
quality of educational institutes.
On an international level, the interest in educational indicators can be demonstrated in
projects like the Indicators of Education Systems (INES) project of the Organization for
Economic Corporation and Development (OECD/CERI, 1996; see also Tuijnman and
Postlethwaite, 1994) or the Educational Indicators Project (CEIP) from the European
Commission (West et al., 1995). The interest in quality of education is also demonstrated in
the Maastricht Treaty on the European Union (article 126, chapter 3): 'the European
Community shall contribute to the development of quality education....' and in subsequent
action programmes like SOCRATES and LEONARDO. On a national level, similar projects
can be identified, regarding the educational performance on a national level as well as a
regional and institutional level (Willms and Kerckhoff, 1995; Croxford and Cowie, 1996;
Ministry of Education, Culture and Science, 1995; Fitz-Gibbon, 1996; Willms, 1992).
In the Netherlands, quality assessment in higher education has been on the public policy
agenda since the publication in 1985 of the paper "Higher Education: Autonomy and
Quality" by the Dutch Ministry of Education, Culture and Science. This paper marked a
change in the administrative relation towards higher education. Instead of a direct control of
the contents and quality of higher education, the Ministry placed higher emphasis on
autonomy and selfregulation for the institutes of higher education (colleges for higher
vocational education and universities). This was to be accompanied by a system of quality
assurance in which the institutes of higher education give an account of their performance.
This system of quality assurance covers all areas of the educational process, such as
inflow of students, study progress (internal output), input of staff and other resources, but
also business administrative aspects. One of the major issues in the system of quality
2assurance is the so-called external output of education, that is e success of graduates on
the labour market.
One problem that may be raised here is that not all differences in the performance of
colleges can be attributed to organizational or educational factors. Instead, some of the
differences between colleges reflect merely differences in student composition or regional
differences in the labour market, factors for which the colleges cannot be held responsible.
Another issue is that these differences are not always systematic, but rather subject to
major variations over time. This indicates that at least part of the differences must b
attributed to sample fluctuations.
In this paper we explore the following questions:
1. Do colleges of higher vocational education vary in the mean success of their graduates
on the labour market, even after controlling for student and region characteristics?
2. Are the differences between these colleges stable over time?
2 Theoretical background
The analysis in this paper draws upon three lines of research: educational effectiveness,
quality assurance and labour market research. 
The educational effectiveness literature has its origin in the work of Coleman et al. (1966),
who tried to assess the factors (school resources mainly) that could account for the value
schools added to students learning, i.e. by controlling for intake differences between
schools. Despite the marginal effects discovered by the authors the quest for which factors
matter in education continued. One line of further research was on school and instructional
effects (Scheerens and Bosker, 1997), whereas the other converged with the economic
tradition of education production function research (Hanushek, 1986; Monk, 1989; Dolan
and Schmidt, 1994). The first demonstrated that schools affect the achievement of their
students to a small but relevant degree, and succeeded in singling out effectiveness
enhancing factors like monitoring practices within schools and achievement pressure for
basic subjects. The results of the research into the educational production fun (looking
for effects of resource variables like pupil-to-teacher ratio, per pupil expenditure, an
teachers' salaries, training and experience) produced less convincing results, although a re-
analysis of the evidence by Hedges et al. (1994) using statistical meta-analysis procedures
resulted in some support for per pupil expenditure being an output enhancing factor. Within
these research traditions, however, no mention is made of research into the labour market
outcomes. Most of the research concentrates on academic performance or on school ca-
reers. This, of course, is caused by the fact that most research concentrates on primary
education. However, one might argue that differences in the educational output will also be
reflected in differences in labour market outcomes. The effects of educational institutions
on labour market outcomes however will probably be less strong, because of the interve-
3ning effects of other factors. 
The second line of research which bears relevance for our analysis relates to research into
quality assurance and the use of performance indicators in higher education. Quality
assurance, planning and resource allocation, particularly during times of financial (govern-
mental) constraints and changing socio-economic demands, involves making choices
between mutually exclusive alternatives each with its own combinations of inputs, outputs,
outcomes, impacts and benefits (e.g. Segers, 1993). At the one hand the institutions of
higher education obtained a greater autonomy with respect to the input and process
factors. On the other hand the institutions are being called more and more to account for
their output. Effectiveness and efficiency became central concepts: higher education
became responsible to manage their institutions by themselves. In this framework it is
relevant to mention that De Jager (1994) shows that the relationship between the organiza-
tional context and structure, and the 'paradigms' of the higher vocational colleges have an
impact on the outcomes of educational policy. These paradigms refer to the pedagogic or
professional role of the staff, the educational mission and internal coalition of the college. 
Countries like the United Kingdom, Australia and the Netherlands adopted ideas and tools
of the U.S. accreditation system. In the Netherlands this lead to a nation wide and public
quality assurance system of visiting committees. All institutions taking care of a discipline
are visited periodically. It is a rolling review process with two complementary phases:
internal evaluation by the faculty, reported in a self-study report and visitations by external
peers. A checklist, consisting of a set of performance indicators, the operationalization of
the dynamic and multidimensional concept of quality, is the guideline for the faculty report
and the comments of the visiting committee. The relevance of the training with respect to
the requirements of the labour market and professional practice are more and more
considered as important indicators to judge the quality of a higher (vocational) educational
discipline. Since decentralization and deregulation of national educational policies resulted
in more autonomy for educational institutions demanding quality assurance was one of the
means for national governments to control qua ity. One of the other means, especially used
in the USA and in the United Kingdom, was the idea of creating a quasi-market mechanism
by publishing process and output data regarding the performance of educational
institutions (e.g. O'Leary, 1996). The performance indicators themselves and the
procedures used to construct them are, however, heavily criticized (e.g. Morrison et al.,
1995; Goldstein and Myers, 1996; Yorke, 1997), with one of the criticisms being that the
indicators do not reflect the value added by the educational institutions, but that the outpu
indicators are to a large degree simple reflections of differences in student input instead.
The third line of research of relevance here is the labour market research. The leading
assumption in human capital and matching theory is that education and training makes
people more productive. Following education can therefore be seen as an investment in
human capital (Becker, 1975; Schultz, 1961) which increases productive skills and will
therefore lead to higher wages. In most research the focus of interest has been on
4explaining differences between types of education, rather than between institutes of
education. A few authors point to the relevance of differences between colleges. Glebbeek
(1989) regards education as a production process with an important feature: the variability
in outcomes. Unlike most production processes, the output f education is characterised by
a large variation in quality. Graduates vary considerably in acquired skills and this variation
is closely linked to the selectivity of the educational process. Colleges that put high
standards in their exams, will produce an output with higher quality and less variation. As
employers have no means of assessing directly the productive skills of an individual, this
variation in quality produces a considerable risk. Especially in branches in which mediocre
functioning of employees produces a high risk (like health care), this could lead to
additional educational requirements. Empirical evidence for this relation between the quality
of a college and overeducation is given by Robst (1995). In a paper examining the relation
between college quality and overeducation, he shows that workers who attended a lower
quality college have a higher likelihood of ending up in a job for which they are
overeducated. In the Netherlands Van der Velden et al. (1989) have shown that the
following factors are relevant for the labour market outcomes: high selectivity during the
training, an appropriate match between education and occupation, effective instruction and
career guidance activities. 
In this paper we restrict the analysis to the question whether there are any differences
between colleges of higher vocational education after controlling for student and regional
factors and leave aside the question to which factors these differences may be attributed.
Bearing in mind the results of the educational effectiveness literature, we expect only
modest differences between colleges in the labour market outcomes. Moreover, we expect
these differences to be larger for employment chances than for outcomes which are more
institutionally defined (e.g. wages).
3  Data and method
In 1991, the Dutch Council for Higher Vocational Education (HBO-Raad) commissioned the
Research Centre for Education and the Labour Market (ROA) to develop an instrument
which assesses the success of graduates on the labour market and which could be used in
the system of quality control by institutes of higher vocational education. This instrument
has been in operation as of 1991. About two thirds of all the colleges make use of it, which
makes it the most important instrument for external quality control.
The instrument consists of an annual survey among graduates of the participating colleges.
In this survey, information is collected about destination, labour market entry, unemploy-
ment spells, and the jobs that the graduates hold. The survey is held one and a half year
after graduation.
The participating institutes of higher vocational education receive standard information
1. Zero corresponding with a job level lower than higher education (overeducation).
2. The difference between these two variables of course is, that monthly wage is dependent on
whether it concerns a parttime or a fulltime job, whereas hourly wages is not.
3. Board experience includes having been board member of a corporation, but also having been a
club's, society's, or association's officer.
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about the results of their own graduates in confidential institute reports. This information
can directly be compared with the national figures for the types of education in question.
Apart from this, a national, public report is published where the results of the total outflow
of a particular sector of higher vocational education is analyzed (see Van de Loo and Van
der Velden, 1994).
In this analysis, data is used from the 1991, 1992 and 1993 survey (Van de Loo et al.,
1992; Van de Loo et al., 1993; Van de Loo and Van der Velden, 1994). This means that
the target population consists of graduates from higher vocational education from the
following cohorts: 1989/90, 1990/91 and 1991/92. These cohorts have each entered the
labour market under different situations. We restrict the dataset to graduates from th
largest types of training within the following six sectors of higher vocational education:
pedagogics, technics, economics, health studies, social studies and fine arts. The selected
courses are: teacher training (for primary education), mechanical engineering, business
administration, nurse training, social work training and music (teacher) training.
In the analysis the following dependent variables are used: a dummy indicating if the
graduate was less than 3 months unemployed during the job entry period ("job entry"), a
dummy indicating if the level of the job corresponded to the level of higher education ("level
of job") and two indicators for income ("gross hourly wage" and "gross monthly wage").1 2
The predictor variables include personal characteristics (sex, age) as well as qualification
and skills characteristics like training course in higher vocational education, previous type of
education, previous job experience, board experience and length of study. The first3
column includes all graduates who entered the labour market. The second column includes
only those who hold a job at the time of the interview. To control for regional and annual
(business cycle) variations on the labour market we include the region where the college is
situated, the region where the graduate is employed, and year of survey.
Table 1 presents some descriptive statistics. Some 15% of the graduates were more than
three months unemployed during the period between graduation and the survey. At the
moment of the survey 79% held a job which matched their educational level. The gross
monthly wages amounted to 2,880 Dutch guilders, while the gross hourly wage was slightly
more than 18 guilders on average.
Table 1
Means (standard deviations) and percentages
6Job entry Income
& level of job
Dependent variables
job entry n.a
- quick (< 3 months) 85.3%
- slow 14.7%
level of job n.a.
- lower than higher vocational 20.9%
- at least higher vocational 79.1%
wages per hour (fl)  n.a. 18.29 (4.23)
monthly wages (kfl)  n.a. 2.88 (0.66)
Predictor Variables
Student level N = 6275 N = 4303s s
sex
- female 60.0% 62.0%
- male 40.0% 37.8%
preliminary education
- senior general 46.5% 45.5%
- pre-university 31.1% 31.3%
- senior vocational 19.6% 20.6%
- higher vocational 0.9% 0.7%
- other education 1.9% 2.0%
job experience
- yes 33.8% 34.0%
- no 66.2% 66.0%
board experience
- yes 25.2% 25.2%
- no 74.8% 74.8%
age 24.63 (2.05) 24.70 (2.06)
length of study (in years) 4.05 (0.63) 4.03 (0.62)
region of work n.a.
- west 48.7%
- north 6.5%
- east 20.7%
- south 22.5%
- foreign 1.6%
Table 1 (continued)
Means (standard deviations) and percentages
Job entry Income
4. This is due to the fact that the male graduates more often than the female graduates of higher
vocational education continue their educational career (Van de Loo et al. (1992-1994)). In this
analysis graduates that continued studying (e.g. in university) are excluded. The analysis only
involves the labour force. In general, women comprise only half of the population of graduates
from Higher Vocational Education.
5. Senior general secondary education (HAVO) has a duration of 5 years after primary education
and is supposed to be the main route to higher vocational education. Pre-university education
(VWO: duration 6 years) is supposed to prepare for university education, although an important
share of its graduates go on to higher vocational education. Senior vocational secondary
education (MBO: duration 3-4 years), which is the normal route for further education for students
graduating from intermediate general secondary education (MAVO: duration 4 years) or from
junior vocational education (LBO: duration 4 years), prepares mainly from the labour market
although it has an increasing share of graduates following further education.
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& level of job
year level N =223 N =223y y
year
- 1991 28.7% 28.7%
- 1992 34.1% 34.1%
- 1993 37.2% 37.2%
department level N =97 N =97d d
study
- pedagogics 25.8% 25.8%
- technics 18.6% 18.6%
- economics 15.5% 15.5%
- health studies 17.5% 17.5%
- social studies 16.5% 16.5%
- fine arts 6.2% 6.2%
college level N =50 N =50c c
region
- west 42.0% n.a.
- north 10.0%
- east 26.0%
- south 22.0%
n.a. = not applicable
A majority (60%) of the sample used for this analysis is female. The mean age is 25 years.4
About a quarter of the graduates had board experience before entering the labour market
and about one third had previous job experience. Senior general secondary education is
the dominant type of previous education, followed by pre-university education and senior
vocational secondary education.5
The number of graduates from higher vocational education is (still) increasing. This is not
only the case in this analysis but also in the total amount of this population in the Nether-
lands. The western part of the Netherlands is both dominant in the educational field, and in
6. For the analysis of job entry the total sample could be used. For the other three analyses the
sample was restricted to those graduates who held a job at the moment of the survey. This
amounts to 4,303 cases.
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the employment. For the northern and eastern regions there is a negative net migration
flow of graduates to this dominant western part in the Netherlands.
The design is nested and consists of the following levels: student, year, department (sector
of college) and the college level. As we selected only one course per sector, th
department level coincides with the training course. We restrict the dataset to those
graduates who, at the moment of the survey, belong to the labour force (employed plus
unemployed). This amounts to a total of 6,275 cases. These were nested in 223 year/de-6
partment/college combinations. These combinations were nested in 97 department/college
combinations and these again were nested in 50 different colleges. Because of the
hierarchical datastructure a multilevel statistical model is applied (Bryk and Raudenbush,
1992; Goldstein, 1995; Longford, 1993).
The multi-level model specification is as follows:
y  = ß  + ßSEX  + ... + ßFOREIGN  + e student-level (1)sydc 0ydc 1 sydc 12 sydc sydc
ß  = ß  + ( 1992  + ( 1993  + u year-level (2)0ydc 00dc 1 ydc 2 ydc 0ydc
ß  = ß  + * TECH  + ... + * ARTS  + v department-level (3)00dc 000c 1 dc 5 dc 00dc
ß  = ß  + . NORTH  + ... + . SOUTH  + w college-level (4)000c 0000 1 c 3 c 000c
In (1) Y  is the score on the dependent variable for student s in year y in department d ofsydc
college c. This score is regressed on twelve student-level predictors with associated
regression coefficients ß to ß . In the estimation procedure each of these are estimated1 12
as a sort of weighted average of a pooled within year/department/college specific
regression coefficient and an across all students regression coefficient. ßis the value for0ydc
the intercept (i.e. the score when all the predictors have a value of zero) for year y in
department d of college c. Since all regression coefficients are fixed the variation in ß0ydc
equals the variation in for student-level predictor differences corrected
year/department/college averages. In its turn this average is regressed on two year-level
predictors (two dummies to represent the three years) with associated regression
coefficients (  and ( . The precision with which these regression coefficients are estimated1 2
depends more on the number of year/department/college combination than on the number
of students (c.f. Snijders and Bosker, 1993). ß represents the score for department d i00dc
college c when all the student- and year-level predictors take on the value of zero. Thes
then are regressed on five department-level-dummy-variables representing the six sectors
within higher vocational education, and in (4) the college-level equation is given (with three
9dummies as predictors representing the four regions).
Furthermore it is assumed that e ~N(0,F ), u  ~N(0,F ), v  ~N(0,F ), and that wsydc e 0ydc u 00dc v 000c
2 2 2
~N(0,F ), i.e. all residuals are normally distributed with zero mean and some (unknown)2w
variance. By definition the residuals are uncorrelated. Regression and variance component
parameters are estimated using maximum likelihood.
For the logistic multi-level regression model, applied to model the binary dependent
variables ("job entry" and "level of job") the logistic link function is used (Wong and Mason,
1985; Bosker and Hofman, 1994). In this case it is assumed that 
(y  # p ) ~ Bernouilli(p) (5)sydc sydc sydc
where p =PR(y =1) is the probability that student s from year y in department d ofsydc sydc
college c will have a job respectively will have an appropriate job. Instead of y logit(p )sydc sydc
will be regressed on the predictors. In this case (1) does not contain a residual, i.e. e=0sydc
Parameters are estimated using penalized quasi-likelihood estimation (Longford, 1993;
Goldstein, 1995). 
The results will indicate that colleges hardly differ in their average performance, but that
departments do. For that reason the second research question (see section 1) will be
modified into an exploration of the stability of departmental performance. The stability of
the performance of the departments is estimated by taking the ratio of the sum of the
estimated between departments and colleges variance to the sum of the estimated
between years, between departments and between colleges variance: 
(F  + F )/(F  + F  + F ) (6)^2 ^2 ^2 ^2 ^2v w u v w
Since the random effects are modelled explicitly, this is the 'true' stability (cf. Willms and
Raudenbush, 1989).
The performance indicators then are constructed using 'shrinkage estimators' (e.g. Bryk
and Raudenbush, 1992), in which precision weights are used to estimate the department
parameters:
ß  = w ß  + (1-w)ß  (7)^* ^ ^*dc dc dc dc
ß  is the Ordinary Least Squares estimator (in models without predictors this is the mean),^
w  the precision weight and ßthe Empirical Bayes estimate of the population meadc
^*
(across the departments and colleges). These precision weights are the ratio's of the
estimated true between department level variance relative to he observed between depart-
ment level variance:
10
w  = F  / (F  + (F  + F /n )/n ) (8)dc v v u e ydc dc
^2 ^2 ^2 ^2
n  is the number of students in year y in department d in college c and n is the numberydc dc
of years in department d in college c.
The gross performance indicators are constructed estimating the parameters without
predictors at the student and college level, but with as predictors year and study since
including these may result in corrections for conjunctural fluctuations and study specific
employment opportunities. The net performance indicators are constructed estimating
parameters in regression models that contain all predictors. Comparing departments is, of
course, not only done on the basis of point estimates for the performance indicators, but
using confidence intervals as well. Goldstein and Healy (1995) have argued that, when
comparing two institutions out of a larger number, confidence intervals are tighter. When
comparing institutions amongst each other the 90%-confidence interval should be derived
from (Goldstein and Healy, 1995, p. 2)
( = 2[1-M{1.64(F +F )/F } (9)1 2 12
in which M is the normal integral, F  is the standard error of the mean for the first and F for1 2
the second institution, and F  is the standard error of the grand mean. ( then is the new12
standard normal score that should be used to construct the 90%-confidence interval (and
usually this value is considerable smaller than 1.64). For a series of means (  is determinedij
for each pair of institutions i and j, and then (b is used.
These comparisons often result in rankings, and we will do this as well. But in ranking the
departments different ranks are assigned if the departments have significantly different
scores on the performance indicators. First of all it is determined for a department d in a
college c how many of the departments have a statistically significant higher score: N(H).dc
Then it is determined how many departments have a statistically significant lower score
than department d in college c: N(L). The "conservative" percentile rank R(C) then isdc dc
calculated as (with N being the total number of departments):dc
R(C) = 100 * {(N(H) + N(L) )/ 2N } (10)c dc dc dc
The result of this conservative ranking procedure is, that ranks are less dispersed, which
reflects the fact that differences between departments are smaller than a complete ranking
would have suggested.
4  Results
As indicated before, a 4-level hierarchical model is used for the analysis with levels student,
year, department, and college. For the dummy variables "job entry" and "level of job" we
7. A smal part of these year-to-year wage differences could be attributed to small deviations in the
survey on wage subjects. Moreover, wages have not been controlled for inflation rate.
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adopted a logistic regression approach. Table 2 presents the results of the 4-level analyses
with predictors year of survey and type of training only. The rankings of the departments on
the basis of these mean gross outcomes for their graduates are presented in the Appendix.
Table 2
Results of the (logistic) 4-level analyses. Regressions coefficients and standard errors (between brac-
kets)
Job entry Level of job Wages Monthly wages
(quick) (high) per hour
intercept 2.047 2.425 15.930 2.509
year level
year
- 1991 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- 1992 -0.268 (.119)* -0.101 (.104) 1.080 (.178)** 0.121 (.028)**
- 1993 -0.355 (.117)**-0.179 (.102) 0.998 (.174)** 0.055 (.028)*
department level
study
- pedagogics 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- technics 0.158 (.195) -0.582 (.169)** 2.570 (.212)** 0.681 (.035)**
- economics -0.035 (.200) -1.143 (.156)** 2.204 (.200)** 0.602 (.035)**
- health studies 1.214 (.232)**-1.529 (.152)** 1.677 (.199)** 0.259 (.034)**
- social studies -0.614 (.219)* -1.448 (.188)** 2.846 (.281)** 0.127 (.046)**
- fine arts -1.454 (.287)**-1.226 (.316)** 5.542 (.506)** -0.547 (.081)**
:  p < .05  *
: p < .01**
Compared to the situation in 1991 the labour market opportunities for graduates worsened
in 1992 and 1993 (see Table 2), due to a harsh recession at the beginning of the nineties,
resulting in significantly lower p oportions of graduates who were less than 3 months unem-
ployed. The effects for 1992 and 1993 as compared to 1991 are estimated to be -0.268
and -0.355 respectively. In general, school-leaving graduates are the first to be affected by
a recession, because employers do react by firing their (regular) personnel, but cease the
recruitment at first. This decrease in employment opportunities was not accompanied by 
significantly lower level of the jobs acquired, although the negative signs for 1992 and 1993
suggests that the proportion of graduates who hold a job below their educational level has
grown. The hourly and monthly wages in 1992 and 1993 are significantly above the 1991
level (approximately 1 Dutch guilder). Between 1992 and 1993 there is a drop in the mean7
monthly wages (0.055 - 0.121 = -0.066), which may be attributed to an increase in part-time
work and lower level jobs.
There are significant differences between the types of studies in labour market outcomes.
8. At the student level there is no variance component for the logistic analyses, because th
dependent variable is a dummy.
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Compared to pedagogics, graduates from health studies show significantly higher proporti-
ons of quick job entry while the graduates from social studies and fine arts suffer signifi-
cantly more from (temporary) unemployment.
The analysis with respect to level of job shows the typical features of the labour market for
teachers, where job entry is ruled by specific demands regarding the proper qualifications
and where most of the graduates become teacher. On the other side, especially th
graduates from health or social studies, and to a somewhat lesser degree graduates from
economics, fine arts, and technics as well are found in labour market segments for
secondary educated graduates, which implies that they are overeducated. 
The hourly wages for graduates from pedagogics are the lowest of all 6 training courses,
which is the result of a separate, compulsory, and low paid, wage scale for beginning
teachers in the Netherlands. The same applies for the monthly wages, with one exception:
the graduates from fine arts have lower monthly wages because of a larger proportion of
people holding part-time jobs.
Table 3 shows the residual variance components at the different levels. For the analysi8
on job entry, we see that there are significant differences in the mean outcomes at all 3
levels. Of the total residual variance of 0.316 (=0.072 + 0.143 + 0.101) at higher levels,
23% can be attributed to differences within departments between the years, 45% to
differences between the different departments within a college, and the resulting 32% to
differences between colleges. In other words, from the total amount of differences between
departments and colleges over the years, 23% is due to change, or put alternatively: the
stability of department effects for job entry over time amounts to 0.77.
For the analysis on level of job, we only detect systematic differences between depart-
ments, with no variation over time and no differences between colleges. In this case the
stability of department effects over time thus is perfect.
For the analysis on hourly wages the picture is quite different. The total variance amounts
to 16.070, only 1% of which can be attributed to differences between departments over the
years. The stability of these department effects is zero: all differences found are due to
variation over time within departments. In the analysis on monthly wages it appears that
there are no differences between departments within colleges, but since the colleges do
differ (and so do departments from different colleges) the stability of the departments can
be estimated as being 0.38.
Table 3
Results of the (logistic) 4-level analyses for 'gross' performance indicators; residual variance com-
ponents
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Job entry Level of job Wages per hour Monthly wages
student level n.a. n.a. 16.070 0.380
year level 0.072 0.000 0.180 0.005
department 0.143 0.059 0.000 0.000
college level 0.101 0.000 0.000 0.003
Table 4 presents the results of the (logistic) 4-level analyses after controlling for student
and regional factors. The results regarding the type of training followed and the year of
survey, are very similar to the former results in table 2. 
Regarding the effects of personal characteristics, we note that males earn 0.4 guilders per
hour more than females. Per month the difference amounts to 134 Dutch guilders in favou
of males. This is remarkably at the beginning of the careers, as most female higher
education graduates have not interrupted their professional careers yet. Age decreases the
chances of being less than 3 months unemployed, but once a job is found it also increases
the wages earned. 
The type of previous education followed only has an effect on the job entry: graduates who
have folowed senior vocational secondary education before entering their course in higher
vocational education, have a higher chance of being less than 3 months unemployed.
Having job experiences before graduation increases the employment chances and also
increases the monthly wages by 51 guilders. There is no significant effect of board
experience. Graduates who finish their study in a relatively short time, increase their
chances of being less than 3 months unemployed and also increase their chances of
acquiring a job which matches their educational level. 
Finally, regional differences in the labour market situation affect the labour market
outcomes. Graduates who attended college in the western part of the Netherlands, have
significantly higher chances of being less than 3 months unemployed than those who
attended college in the south, the east and especially the north. It is likely that these
regional differences mainly are the result of regional employment differences, although the
possible better acquaintance and image of the western colleges for employers (in th
Table 4
Results of the (logistic) 4-level analyses for 'net' performance indicators. Regressions coefficients
and standard errors (between brackets)
Job entry Level of job Wages Monthly wages
(quick) (high) per hour
GRAND MEAN 5.678 3.076 1.797 (0.141) 8.526
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student level
Sex
- female 0.000     0.000 0.000 0.000
- male 0.101 (0.102) 0.025 (0.109) 0.126 (0.026) 0.392 (0.171)***
age -0.112 (0.022) 0.016 (0.023) 0.034 (0.006) 0.342 (0.036)**** **
Preliminary education
- higher general 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- pre-university -0.005 (0.099) -0.021 (0.100) -0.014 (0.024) 0.031 (0.154)
- senior vocational 0.226 (0.118) -0.152 (0.119) 0.005 (0.029) -0.149 (0.186)
- higher vocational -0.169 (0.351) 0.414 (0.576) -0.192 (0.115) -0.657 (0.743)
- other education 0.125 (0.263) 0.017 (0.294) -0.035 (0.071) -0.130 (0.459)
length of study -0.159 (0.065) -0.275 (0.071) -0.024 (0.017) -0.196 (0.111)* **
job experience
- no 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- yes 0.208 (0.090) 0.136 (0.087) 0.048 (0.021) 0.159 (0.136)* *
board experience
- no 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- yes 0.080 (0.090) 0.160 (0.094) 0.019 (0.022) 0.145 (0.140)
region of work n.a.
- west 0.000 0.000 0.000
- north -0.148 (0.177) -0.171 (0.044) -0.372 (0.262)**
- east 0.086 (0.116) -0.121 (0.028)** -0.356 (0.165)*
- south 0.083 (0.116) -0.082 (0.029)** -0.307 (0.163)
- foreign 0.368 (0.335) 0.667 (0.074)** 4.242 (0.481)**
year level
year
- 1991 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- 1992 -0.285 (0.115) -0.128 (0.105) 0.122 (0.027) 1.081 (0.170)***
- 1993 -0.346 (0.113) -0.196 (0.103) 0.052 (0.027) 0.971 (0.165)***
department level
pedagogics 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
- technics 0.150 (0.206) -0.436 (0.196) 0.554 (0.042)** 1.963 (0.255)***
- economics -0.073 (0.191) -1.093 (0.167) 0.524 (0.037)** 1.762 (0.215)****
- health studies 1.260 (0.219) -1.573 (0.154) 0.216 (0.033)** 1.374 (0.195)**** **
- social studies -0.592 (0.207) -1.466 (0.193) 0.066 (0.046) 2.321 (0.279)*** **
- fine arts -1.119 (0.289) -0.963 (0.353) -0.772 (0.087)** 3.848 (0.542)****
college level
region n.a. n.a.
- west 0.000
- north -0.989 (0.203)**
- east -0.509 (0.157)**
- south -0.570 (0.160)**
n.a. = not applicable
western part of the Netherlands) also plays a role in these outcomes. In the west wages are
significantly higher than in the other parts of the Netherlands, amounting to 164 guilders
difference with the mean monthly wages in the north. Those who found a job abroad earn
the highest wages with a difference of 677 guilders compared to the monthly wages in the
west.
Table 5 presents the residual variance components at the different levels, after taking
account of the student and regional factors. We note that the residual variance at the
college level for "job entry" has dropped considerably. The total residual variance now
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amounts to 0.193, which means that 30% of the original residual variance at the three
higher levels is explained by student factors or region. There is no residual variance left at
the college level, indicating that differences between institutes of higher vocational
education must be attributed to the effects of a department, rather than the effect of th
college as a whole. To give an example, a college may have a relatively well performing
technics department, and at the same time a relatively bad performing health department.
The performance of the different departments within a college is unrelated to each other. A
part of the department effects varies over the years. The tability of the department effects,
after controlling for student and regional factors, can now be estimated to be 0.68
(=0.132/(0.061+0.132)).
Table 5
Results of the (logistic) 4-level analyses for 'net' performance indicators; residual variance
components
Job entry Level of job Wages per hour Monthly wages
student level n.a. n.a. 15.240 0.360
year level 0.059 0.000 0.126 0.004
department level 0.144 0.055 0.000 0.000
college level 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.003
For "level of job" we note results very similar to the former model. There is no residual
variance at year or college level. Introducing student and regional variables causes only a
very small drop in the residual variance at the department level. Only 2% of the original
residual variance at this level is accounted for by these variables. 
For "hourly wages" and "monthly wages" the model hardly improves by introducing the
student and regional variables. In the case of "hourly wages" the drop in residual variances
at all levels is only 5%. The residual variances at department and college level remain zero:
there are no systematic differences between departments or colleges in this respect. In the
case of "monthly wages", introduction of the student and regional variables 'explain ' 6% of
the original residual variance. There remain very small systematic differences in labour
market outcomes between colleges and departments, but a large part of these effects is
due to variation over time.
The residual effects at the department level may be regarded as the performance indicator
of a department regarding the labour market outcomes. In this respect, it is interesting to
compare the 'gross' performance with the 'net' performance, that is the performance after
taking account of the student and regional factors. Table 6 presents the correlations
between the gross and net performance indicators. One conclusion that may be drawn, is
that the correlation between gross and net indicators is high, but not perfect. In the case of
"job entry" the correlation between the two indicators is 0.77, indicating that only 59% of the
differences in the net outcomes of a department is correctly predicted by the gross
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outcomes. In the case of "monthly wages" the predictive value of the gross outcomes is
67%, while in the case of "level of job" the predictive value of gross outcomes is almost
perfect. This can also be illustrated by the rankings presented in the Appendix. In the case
of "job entry" in 11 out of 97 cases the ranking of gross and net outcomes differs more than
10 or more percentile points, turning a relatively well-performing department into a relatively
bad one and vice versa. In the case of "monthly wages" this happens only in 8 out of 97
cases, while in the case of "level of job" it does not happen at all.
Table 6
Spearman rank correlations between department level quality indicators
job entry gross 1.000
job entry net 0.752** 1.000
level of job gross 0.018 0.112 1.000
level of job net -0.023 0.068 0.927* 1.000
monthly wages gross 0.240* 0.071 0.097 0.100 1.000
monthly wages net -0.060 0.073 0.246 0.230 0.600** 1.000
job entry job entry level of level of montly monthly
gross net job gross job netwages gross wages net
: p < .05   *
: p < .01**
Interesting are the low correlations between the outcomes of the three different types of net
indicators: "job entry", "level of job" and "monthly wages". The correlation between the first
and the second is 0.07, between the first and the third 0.07 and between the second and
third 0.23. In other words, having a good score on one quality indicator has no predictive
value for the score on another indicator. Put alternatively, what makes a department
effective in one area, does not necessarily makes it effective in another area. Again this
can be illustrated by the rankings of the departments in the appendix. Take for example the
departments for pedagogics, i.e. the training course 'teacher primary education'. Here we
can see colege 94 having good scores on the first net quality indicator "job entry", but its
score on the other two net performance indicators is on average. On the other hand, we
see that college 54 has a low percentile rank for "job entry", but it scores on average as
well on the other two net performance indicators. None of the departments does either
extremely well or extremely poor on two or three net performance indicators.
5  Summary and conclusions
The main results can be summarized as follows:
1) There are systematic differences between departments and colleges in the following
quality indicators with respect to the labour market outcomes of their graduates:
chance of being less than 3 months unemployed; chance of acquiring a job which
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matches the educational level attained and gross monthly wages. 
2) These effects remain significant even after controlling for student and regional factors.
They are due to differences between departments rather than differences between
colleges.
3) The department effects are rather stable in the case of chances of being less than 3
months unemployed and of acquiring a job which matches the educational level
attained. In the case of monthly wages the effects vary considerably over time.
4) The net quality indicator of a department (i.e. the outcome after controlling for student
and regional factors) differs considerably from the gross quality indicator, except in
the case of level of job. 
5) Departments which effectively improve their graduates' chances of finding a job are
not necessarily also effective in improving the chances of finding high quality work, as
indicated by level of job or wage. 
What are the theoretical and empirical implications of the previous analysis?
First of all, it seems important to extend educational effectiveness research to the area of
labour market outcomes. Departments do have an effect on the labour market success of
their graduates. The leading theories within the educational effectiveness research,
however, seem to bear only little relevance with regard to these labour market outcomes.
To build a coherent theoretical framework, theories of effective instruction and effective
educational institutions need to be integrated with theories about the role of education in
selection processes on the labour market (Van der Velden et al., 1989).
The analysis shows that departments which are effective in the area of improving their
graduates' employment chances, are not necessarily effective in the area of improving the
quality of the jobs which the graduates hold. This is in line with previous analyses of Van
der Velden and Wieling (1994) and Van Smoorenburg and Van der Velden (1995), who
showed that the labour market position of types of education can be distinguished in two
major dimensions: employment chances and quality of work. These dimensions can be
shown to be theoretically and empirically independent. The fact that these two dimensions
are also relevant in the analysis of differences between institutes, stresses the importance
of this distinction. In the theoretical framework it is important to elaborate on the factors
which make an institute more effective in one area and which factors are of importance in
the other area. 
Bearing in mind the growing importance of external quality control both for higher education
as well as for secondary education, implicates that there is an increasing need for valid and
reliable information about the performance with respect to labour market outcomes of
institutes of education. In this respect, the added value of an institute, i.e. the performanc
after controlling for input or regional factors, is of particular interest. Given the fact that the
net performance of an institute quite often differs considerably from the gross performance,
institutes hould only be judged on the basis of this net performance. The model presented
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here offers a way of calculating these 'net' quality indicators.
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Appendix
'Conservative' percentile ranks for departments on 6 performance indicators1)
 (the table is ordered according to the ranking on gross monthly wages within each study)
studydepartment job entry job entry job level job level monthly monthly
number gross net gross net wages wages
gross net
1 68 44 43 51 51 40 37
1  7 51 52 51 51 48 49
1 18 45 50 51 51 48 53
1 22 51 52 51 51 48 49
1 35 51 52 50 50 48 49
1 36 46 55 51 51 48 49
1 54 25 15 51 51 48 49
1 55 38 35 51 50 48 48
1 59 43 51 51 51 48 51
1 65 20 14 50 50 48 49
1 79 55 52 51 51 48 37
1 85 65 56 51 51 48 48
1 86 46 49 50 50 48 48
1 88 52 49 51 51 48 48
1 92 51 51 50 50 48 48
1  1 70 57 51 51 49 48
1 13 19 14 51 51 49 53
1 30 52 54 51 50 49 53
1 94 73 88 52 52 49 53
1 52 37 40 51 51 51 53
1 97 52 53 52 52 51 51
1 47 63 56 51 50 52 53
1 27 55 57 52 52 53 61
1 69 57 53 51 51 53 53
1 62 70 61 51 51 91 80
2 60 51 56 51 51 44 48
2  8 48 49 51 51 48 49
2 19 53 55 51 51 48 53
2 37 45 52 51 51 48 49
2 39 52 55 49 50 48 49
2 49 40 52 51 51 48 49
2 56 52 54 51 50 48 51
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studydepartment job entry job entry job level job level monthly monthly
number gross net gross net wages wages
gross net
2 74 52 52 52 51 48 49
2 78 52 53 51 51 48 51
2 82 40 19 49 50 48 48
2 87 52 56 51 51 48 48
2 89 54 51 51 51 48 48
2  2 58 52 52 53 49 48
2 14 44 51 51 51 49 53
2 31 48 52 50 50 49 53
2 53 46 52 52 52 51 53
2 44 45 30 51 51 53 49
2 70 52 52 51 51 53 53
3 61 40 49 51 51 44 48
3 12 52 51 32 33 48 37
3 17 52 53 51 51 48 49
3 23 51 52 51 51 48 49
3 38 38 49 51 51 48 49
3 40 45 52 54 53 48 49
3 48 24 45 51 51 48 51
3 57 52 53 51 51 48 51
3 73 52 51 51 51 48 49
3 77 36 41 50 50 48 49
3 84 57 52 51 50 48 48
3 90 68 57 51 51 48 48
3 93 55 57 54 52 48 51
3  3 58 52 47 49 49 48
3 32 49 52 51 51 49 53
3 51 51 49 51 51 51 51
3 45 57 53 52 52 53 49
4 25 52 52 42 44 33 11
4 67 48 51 53 52 44 48
4  9 51 52 51 51 48 49
4 20 54 56 52 52 48 53
4 24 48 49 53 53 48 49
4 28 52 52 52 52 48 49
4 41 46 49 53 52 48 49
4 75 61 57 42 42 48 49
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studydepartment job entry job entry job level job level monthly monthly
number gross net gross net wages wages
gross net
4 80 53 52 51 51 48 37
4 91 57 52 51 51 48 48
4  4 59 52 9 11 49 48
4 33 52 55 52 52 49 53
4 95 48 41 52 52 49 53
4 71 52 52 51 51 53 53
4 63 52 45 51 51 91 80
5  6 48 49 51 51 48 51
5 10 47 37 51 51 48 49
5 21 52 52 51 51 48 53
5 26 52 52 50 50 48 48
5 29 56 57 47 48 48 49
5 42 49 52 51 51 48 49
5 50 40 52 51 51 48 49
5 58 47 49 51 51 48 51
5 76 60 57 51 51 48 49
5 81 58 54 51 51 48 37
5 15 36 45 51 51 49 53
5 34 46 49 51 51 49 53
5 96 52 52 51 51 49 53
5 46 52 52 51 51 53 49
5 72 52 49 51 51 53 53
5 64 65 54 50 50 91 80
6 16 42 49 51 51 48 48
6 43 47 52 51 51 48 49
6 66 47 52 51 51 48 49
6 83 57 53 51 51 48 51
6  5 63 53 51 51 49 48
6 11 48 49 50 50 51 51
: A department is a unique combination of college number and study1)
Legend: study: 1 = pedagogics (teacher for primary education)
2 = technics (mechanical engineering)
3 = health studies(nurse training)
4 = economics (business administration)
5 = social studies(social work)
6 = fine arts (training for musician)
